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ABSTRACT  
This paper describes the background and provides the rationale and the framework to embrace the whole 
spectrum of measures (regulatory, design, operational and emergency response) for improving the 
damage survivability of existing RoRo Passenger vessels. The damage stability workshop elaborated here 
is the first step of a process initiated by INTERFERRY Europe to assess impact on/options for existing 
ships of increasing the required subdivision index R should IMO decide to apply new damage stability 
requirements retrospectively. This, in turn, would provide the motivation for instigating and establishing a 
framework and propose an approach for alternative compliance to account for the contribution made to 
damage survivability by operational and active damage control measures that could be undertaken in case 
of a flooding accident. This represents a step change both in the mind-set of naval architects and in safety 
legislation but the impact will be immense and mostly positive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent discussions at IMO on the safety of 
passenger ships include a potential increase in the 
required subdivision index for all passenger ships. 
An initiative, started by INTERFERRY Europe, 
seeks to assess the impact of the above on 
existing vessels (if such changes were applied 
retrospectively) and propose an approach for 
alternative compliance based on a fair recognition 
and credit of the contribution to risk reduction 
afforded by operational and active damage 
control measures that would be undertaken in 
case of a flooding accident. This should be 
accounted for, in addition to the contribution 
made by traditional design measures. This 
approach was first presented in the 13th ISSW in 
BREST 2013, [1]. To this end, a tentative plan of 
action was prepared to carry out a study aimed at 
quantifying and validating the risk-reduction 
effectiveness potential of such measures. The 
proposal included a one-day workshop to discuss 
the context and the relevant issues on the subject 
as a first step in the process. This took place in 
London on 22 January 2014 with a participation 
of 19 persons representing 5 ferry operators, 1 
class society, 1 yard, 2 Flag Administrations and 
a number of damage stability experts.  
Following a brief description of the rationale in 
support of adopting an alternative compliance 
approach that accounts for all meritorious 
contribution to enhancing damage survivability, 
the paper focuses on the objectives of and the key 
outcomes from the damage stability workshop. 
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BACKGROUND 
Every time there is an accident with passenger 
ships, exposing their vulnerability to flooding as a 
result of collision/grounding accidents, societal 
outcry follows and industry and academia 
³EXFNOHXS´GHOYLQJIRUGHVLJQLPSURYHPHQWVWR
address the Achilles heel of this ship type, namely 
inadequate damage stability.  However, any such 
improvements are targeting mainly newbuildings, 
which comprise a small minority of the existing 
fleet.  Therefore, state-of-the-art knowledge on 
damage stability is all but wasted, scratching only 
the surface of the problem and leaving thousands 
of ships with severe vulnerability, that is likely to 
lead to further (unacceptably high) loss of life. 
This problem is exacerbated still further, today 
more rapidly, as the pace of scientific and 
technological developments is unrelenting, 
raising understanding and capability to address 
damage stability improvements of newbuildings 
cost-effectively, in ways not previously 
considered.  As a result, SOLAS is becoming 
progressively less relevant and unable to keep up 
with this pace of development.  This has led to 
gaps and pitfalls, which not only undermine 
safety but inhibit progress.   
 
However, lack of retrospectively applied 
legislation (supported by what is commonly 
known as the Grandfather Clause) is not the only 
reason for damage stability problems with 
passenger ships. Tradition should share the blame 
here.  In the quest for damage stability 
improvement, design (passive) measures have 
traditionally been the only means to achieve it in 
a measurable/auditable way (SOLAS 2009, Ch. 
II-1).  However, in principle, the consequences 
from inadequate damage stability can also be 
reduced by operational (active) measures, which 
may be very effective in reducing loss of life (the 
residual risk). There are two reasons for this.  The 
first relates to the traditional understanding that 
operational measures safeguard against erosion of 
the design safety envelop (possible increase of 
residual risk over time). The second derives from 
lack of measurement and verification of the risk 
reduction potential of any active measures.  In 
simple terms, what is needed is the means to 
account for risk reduction by operational 
measures as well as measures that may be taken 
during emergencies. Such risk reduction may then 
be considered alongside risk reduction deriving 
from design measures.   
 
Therefore, new measures for risk reduction 
(operational and in emergencies) should be 
considered in addition to design measures.  What 
needs to be demonstrated and justified is the level 
of risk reduction and a way to account for it, the 
latter by adopting a formal process and taking 
requisite steps to institutionalise it.  
LIFE-CYCLE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Traditionally rules, as a risk control measure for 
damage stability improvement, always focus on 
design solutions, normally referred to as passive 
measures (category 1 measures), Figure 1, [1]. 
Operational/active measures (category 2 
measures) whilst abundant in SOLAS Ch. II-2 
(e.g. damage control), have not been validated to 
the same level of rigour as category 1 measures. 
Finally, measures/systems focusing on emergency 
response (category 3 measures), such as 
Decision Support Systems for Crisis 
Management, Evacuation, LSA, Escape and 
Rescue, whilst fuelling debates on being effective 
risk control measures or not, the cost-
effectiveness of their risk reduction potential has 
never been measured nor verified.  One of the 
reasons for this, arguably, derives from the fact 
that because these measures are there to address 
µUHVLGXDO¶ ULVN DQG UHVLGXDO ULVN LV E\ GHILQLWLRQ
small, therefore risk reduction is also perceived to 
be small.  However, this could not be further from 
the truth. The second is again lack of 
measurement and verification of such risk 
reduction. 
  
Considering the above, a life-cycle perspective 
offers a framework for a holistic approach to 
damage stability, focusing on life cycle and 
encompassing all 3 categories of risk control 
options, accounting for these based on IMO cost-
effectiveness criteria.  This assumes that the risk 
reduction potential of all measures in the three 
categories is known and this is where there is a 
big gap in this approach that needs to be 
overcome before such a process can be 
formalised and adopted. This constitutes the 
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kernel of the work to be undertaken, with the 
workshop described in the following constituting 
and facilitating the first step. 
  
 
 
Fig. 1:  Vulnerability Management, [1]  
 
WORKSHOP ± BRAINSTORMING 
SESSION 
The brainstorming session was conducted on the 
basis of a number of basic premises related to risk 
as defined below. Mind maps were used to record 
the views of the participants. Whilst this method 
is relatively unstructured, it allows recording of 
high-level discussions of hazards, influencing 
factors and risk control measures.  
 
Risk 
 
x Risk can be quantified by the likelihood of 
undesirable consequences (e.g. fatalities per 
ship year, total losses per year, etc.) 
x The range of undesirable consequences 
includes: impact on human life (fatalities and 
injuries) and impact on property (loss of 
and/or damage to the ship). 
x For the purposes of this workshop, the 
accidental event that may lead to undesirable 
FRQVHTXHQFHVLV³IORRGLQJ´. 
 
Accidental flooding events 
 
x Water ingress and flooding may be the result 
of casualty incidents or systems failure 
including ± but not limited to the following: 
1. Collision 
2. Contact (e.g. with quay) 
3. Bottom/side raking damage 
4. Failure (e.g. crack) of hull envelope 
5. Failure of overboard valve 
x Incidents resulting in internal flooding (ballast 
water, fuel oils, etc.) may be the result of the 
following types of systems failures 
6. Internal structural failure (e.g. ballast tank, 
manhole, structural degradation, etc.); 
7. Failure of fire mains valve. 
 
Risk Reduction 
 
In order to reduce the risk associated with 
flooding, the likelihood of occurrence and/or the 
severity of the consequences need to be reduced. 
 
Reducing the likelihood of a flooding event 
x Although, it was agreed that this is an 
important element of the risk associated with 
flooding, this is out with the scope of the 
workshop. However, some of the factors affect 
both likelihood and consequences (e.g. crew 
competence). 
 
Reducing the severity of the consequences of a 
flooding event 
x The internal watertight subdivision is a 
passive barrier or risk control measure, the 
objective of which is to reduce the severity of 
the consequences should a flooding event 
occurs;  
x However, as indicated in the foregoing, there 
are other measures that may reduce the 
severity of the consequences (mitigation) of a 
flooding event. Those measures are of 
operational and/or active nature and as such 
less amenable to statutory verification unless 
an alternative method is applied.  
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Risk Contributing Factors 
  
x There are also other factors that can influence 
the severity of the consequence of flooding. 
These factors influence the sequence of events 
that occur after the accidental event. The 
sequence of events can be generalised in terms 
of the following activities, see Table 1: 
1. Flooding detection and alarm 
2. Damage control 
3. Muster of pax 
4. Preparation of LSA 
5. Abandon ship  
6. Rescue to a place of safety 
x Identification of the factors that influence the 
outcome of each of the above stages, is one of 
the key objectives of the brainstorming 
session. These factors can be of the following 
types: 
1. Human (crew, passengers) 
2. Hardware (e.g. ship, systems, equipment)  
3. Organisational (e.g. procedures)  
4. External (e.g. weather-related, SAR assets) 
x In addition, human and organisational factors 
are significant in terms of Damage Control 
and Emergency Response performance. 
 
Table 1 
Generic sequence of events that may occur after a 
flooding event (typical muster list) 
 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 
INCIDENT 
(1) Detection & 
Alarm 
(2) Damage 
control 
(5) Abandon 
Ship 
(6) Rescue 
(3) Muster of 
Pax 
(4) 
Preparation of 
LSA 
 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 
 
Risk contributing factors and potential hazards 
were identified as listed below. These lists only 
reflect the scope of the discussions and therefore 
are not exhaustive; they can however be regarded 
to be representative.  
 
Stage 1: Detection and Alarm 
Relevant hazards identified during the 
brainstorming session include: 
1. Flooding in space not fitted with water alarms 
2. No/difficult access for validation of alarm 
3. Failure or impairment of automatic means of 
detection 
4. Not effective (slow) means of detection 
5. Trips, falls, exposure to flood water when 
trying to validate an alarm 
6. Crew not familiar with layout of the ship 
7. No information or uncertainty about the 
location and the extent of the damage 
8. Unclear, ineffective procedures (reference to 
muster list) 
9. Poor competence of crew ± lack of training in 
flooding detection 
10. Lack of crew preparedness in searching for 
water  
11. Poor/ineffective internal and/or external 
communications 
12. Initiation of mustering (general alarm) too 
soon ± this will create MUSTERING hazards 
unnecessarily 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Breakdown of identified hazards (60 
hazards in total) 
 
Stage 2: Damage Control 
 
Relevant hazards identified during the 
brainstorming session include: 
1. High vulnerability of watertight subdivision & 
arrangements to flooding  
2. Impairment of watertight subdivision & 
arrangements (due to accidental event) 
3. Ineffective/blocked scuppers in car deck  
4. No/difficult access for effective damage 
control (e.g. vehicles on car deck, voids) 
5. No/difficult access to damage control 
equipment. 
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6. Additional hydrostatic pressure on internal 
structures, doors and bulkhead penetrations  
7. No redundancy of essential ship systems after 
flooding  
8. Crew not prepared/not able to reconfigure 
systems for damage control  
9. Trips, falls, exposure to flood water when 
trying to deploy damage control measures 
10. Ship systems not dimensioned for dealing with 
damage control (e.g. pumps) 
11. No information or uncertainty about the 
location and the extent of the damage, 
especially if flooding is escalating 
12. Crew not able to effectively assess the 
criticality of the damage  
13. Poor competence of crew ± not trained in 
damage control 
14. Lack of crew preparedness in damage control 
15. Crew not familiar with layout of the ship 
16. Crew not available for damage control (low 
crew redundancy) 
17. Lack of effective leadership in an emergency 
situation  
18. Breakdown of internal communication (due to 
language barriers, inappropriate use or failure 
of communications equipment) 
19. Ineffective/unhelpful external support  
20. Rough weather, cold climates. 
 
Stage 2: Muster of Pax & Preparation of LSA 
 
Relevant hazards identified during the 
brainstorming session include: 
1. False alarm ± muster initiation too soon, 
would create unnecessary hazards for pax 
2. Impairment of escape routes, muster areas 
and/or LSA systems (due to accidental event) 
3. Impairment or failure of lighting along escape 
routes and/or muster areas (e.g. due to 
blackout as a result of the flooding) 
4. Impairment or failure of internal 
communication systems (e.g. due to blackout 
as a result of flooding) 
5. Ship motions, heel, trim ± making moving to 
muster areas difficult and hazardous 
6. Trips and falls when moving to muster area 
7. Exposure to weather (to pax if mustering 
externally; to crew when preparing LSA)  
8. Inefficient internal communication (with pax) 
9. Difficult pax behaviour ± crew not prepared in 
crowd control 
10. Not sufficient crew numbers available to assist 
pax (e.g. due to damage control efforts) and 
control of mustering. 
 
Stage 3: Abandon Ship 
 
Relevant hazards identified during the 
brainstorming session include: 
1. Fast ship capsize  
2. Poor/delayed decision by the Master  
3. Impairment of embarkation areas and/or LSA 
(due to accidental event) 
4. Failure of deployment of LSA systems 
5. Impairment or failure of emergency 
abandonment systems (e.g. due to blackout as 
a result of flooding) 
6. MOB situation 
7. Lack of key crew redundancy 
8. Rough weather 
9. Large heel and trim angles (in excess of LSA 
design criteria) 
10. Poor competence of crew ± not trained in 
deployment and use of all LSA on-board 
11. Lack of crew preparedness in LSA 
deployment and embarkation 
12. Not sufficient competent crew numbers 
available to deploy and control LSA units  
13. Poor/ineffective passage planning (with SAR 
in mind). 
 
Stage 4: Rescue to Place of Safety 
 
Relevant hazards identified during the 
brainstorming session include: 
1. Ineffective/no SAR planning 
2. Safe place (to transfer people) not available  
3. Unavailability of adequate SAR assets (for the 
number of persons) 
4. Lack of crew preparedness 
5. Poor/ineffective communication with external 
stakeholders (safe port, class, Coastal and Flag 
State) 
6. Rough weather 
 
FLOODING RISK MITIGATION OPTIONS 
 
Although it was acknowledged that it is always 
preferable to have passive or semi-automatic 
measures in place, the discussion was focused on 
active and operational damage mitigation options 
including the following (see Figure 1): 
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Design Modifications (Category 1) 
 
The following observations can be made: 
x Passive measures providing additional 
buoyancy (sponsons, ducktails, buoyancy 
tanks, etc.); 
x The performance of design modifications is 
related to the effectiveness of flooding 
mitigation; 
x The effectiveness of design modifications does 
not depend explicitly on crew performance; 
x Design modifications reducing the inherent 
vulnerability to flooding; from all mitigation 
measures, they may have the highest potential 
for improving the value of the A-index (Figure 
3) 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Vulnerability Screening (identification of 
focal areas for improved survivability) 
 
x Well known solutions and their implications ± 
relating to the following 
9 Double hull machinery room 
9 Rendering decks watertight 
9 Relocation of openings 
9 SWT / Splash-tight doors (Fire doors) 
9 Buoyancy tanks 
 
Operational Measures (Category 2) 
 
In relation to containment actions, the following 
observations were made: 
x Containment actions limit the severity of the 
consequences of a flooding accident by 
preventing progressive flooding 
x Limited experience on merchant ships ±better 
experience on naval vessels 
x Simple tools and equipment available on-
board 
x Crew competence and preparedness is a 
significant influencing factor in ensuring that 
containment actions are effective  
x However, in terms of statutory A index 
calculations or flooding simulations, it is 
assumed that the existing watertight integrity 
performs as expected, e.g. watertight doors do 
not leak, penetrations in watertight bulkheads 
do not leak, etc. 
 
In relation to active damage control, the 
following observations can be made: 
x Counter ballasting and/or counter flooding 
measures limit the severity of the 
consequences of a flooding accident by 
preventing excessive heel/trim of the ship 
(Figure 4) 
 
Fig. 4: Counter-ballasting capacity post-casualty 
(typical example) 
 
x Damage-specific measures not possible in all 
cases  
x Depends on tank and internal arrangements  
x Relies on the availability of relevant ship 
systems (bilge, ballast, power, among others) 
x Large number of possibilities ± difficult to 
assess and do by the crew without support 
x Hazard of significant hydrostatic loads on 
internal structures 
x Potential for using new materials/technologies 
(e.g. foams, inflatable devices): 
o Fast semi-automatic deployment, essential   
o To be effective in critical damages where 
time to capsize less than say 20 minutes  
o Requires type approval and additional 
maintenance and training 
x Crew competence and preparedness as well as 
availability of relevant ship systems are 
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significant influencing factors for ensuring 
that active damage control actions are 
effective  
x The contribution to A-index can be assessed 
by means of flooding simulations (not by 
statutory calculations). However, in order to 
ensure that the actions can be accomplished 
effectively, crew performance and availability 
of relevant ship systems needs to be 
demonstrated.  
 
Some radical actions were identified, for which 
the following observations can be made: 
x Running the ship aground when/if possible 
x Unloading cargo overboard when/if necessary  
x Such actions will require additional planning 
and crew preparedness. 
 
Emergency Response Measures (Category 3) 
 
These relate mainly to escape, evacuation and 
rescue arrangements; for which the following 
comments were made: 
x Measures reducing the severity of the 
consequences of a flooding accident by 
allowing the persons on-board to abandon the 
vessel. 
x Effective evacuation requires the vessel to 
remain afloat and upright ± to the limits of 
LSA systems 
x Crew competence and preparedness as well as 
availability of relevant ship systems are 
significant influencing factors for ensuring 
that people on-board can be evacuated 
effectively 
 
WORKSHOP OUTCOME 
The outcome of the workshop discussions and 
subsequent analysis is presented under the 
following headings: 
x Long-terms goals 
x Ship vulnerability to flooding 
x Active flooding mitigation 
x Risk reduction 
 
Long-terms goals  
Although in the short to medium term, the goal of 
the initiative started by INTERFERRY EUROPE 
is related to the potential retrospective application 
of increased R-index requirements, the 
participants of the workshop agreed that the long-
term goals and implications of the issues 
addressed in the workshop need to be established.  
 
Key items that will be affected include: 
1. Alternative arrangements and credit for 
operations/emergency response measures 
2. Definition and interpretation of required 
subdivision index R, SOLAS Ch.II-1 
Regulation 6. 
3. Alternative methodology for the calculation of 
the A index value ± in accordance with 
SOLAS Ch.II-1 Regulation 4. 
4. Verification of essential ship systems 
redundancy for existing ships. This is in line 
with SOLAS Ch.II-2 Safe return to Port 
requirements for ship systems 
5. Evacuation and LSA arrangements ± 
considering that SOLAS Ch.III is under 
revision.  
6. Verification and validation of crew 
preparedness and performance. ISM Code 
implementation is the minimum level or 
performance expected;  
7. Contribution from INTERFERRY on potential 
changes to SOLAS and the ISM Code. 
 
Ship vulnerability to flooding 
 
In terms of the subdivision index, used for design 
verification of ship damage stability, the 
following observations can be made:  
1. The required index of subdivision R expressed 
the accepted probability of a ship surviving a 
collision incident for 30 minutes or more. 
Consequently, the attained index A reflects the 
average probability of a ship surviving 30 
minutes or more, such average deriving from 
consideration of damage statistics as described 
in SOLAS 2009.  
2. On this basis, a ship attaining a value of 
A=0.8, implies that the ship has a 20% 
average probability of capsize within 30 
minutes, following flooding of ship spaces as 
a result of collision damage.  
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3. The statutory calculation1 of A-index 
encompasses many empirical approximations 
(e.g. s-factor) and conservative assumptions, 
some of which are not justified in practice 
(e.g. loading conditions).  
 
Moreover, there is extensive knowledge and 
evidence to make the following assertions: 
4. A method based on numerical (flooding) 
simulations and Monte-Carlo sampling 
techniques can be used reliably as an 
alternative approach to the statutory 
calculation of the A-index, in accordance with 
SOLAS Ch.II-1 Regulation 4.2.  
5. Previous studies have shown that by using this 
alternative method, the simplicity and 
conservatism implicit in the statutory 
calculations may, in some cases lead to 
underestimation, while in other cases lead to 
overestimation of the attained index A. 
(Figures 5 and 6)  
6. Furthermore, regarding these flooding cases in 
which a ship is likely to capsize within 30 
minutes, it has been shown that in some cases, 
(i) the ship will have no damage stability at 
all: i.e. the ship will capsize fast, whilst in 
other cases (ii) the ship may be recovered with 
effective active damage control: i.e. the ship 
can be saved or the time to capsize can be 
extended to allow for evacuation (Figure 4) 
7. The alternative approach is a better method for 
assessing the vulnerability of a ship to 
flooding, regardless of the type of accident 
(collision, grounding, raking damage, etc.).  
8.  The use of the alternative approach to assess 
ship vulnerability has many benefits; it allows 
the incorporation of realistic operating 
conditions and it allows the verification of 
active damage control actions such as counter-
ballast and counter-flooding, and by providing 
information on time line of events, it allows 
assessing the effectiveness of the evacuation 
arrangements 
                                                 
1 5HIHUUHGWRDVµ62/$6¶FDOFXODWLRQ 
 
Fig. 5: SOLAS Vs Numerical Simulations (Reg. 
4, Part B) ± Simple Internal Architecture 
 
Fig. 6: SOLAS Vs Numerical Simulations (Reg. 
4, Part B) ± Medium Complexity Internal 
Architecture 
 
Active Flooding Mitigation 
 
Assuming that an alternative method for 
assessing ship vulnerability to flooding is 
adopted, active flooding mitigation options for 
which credit can be obtained in terms of the 
attained A-index (by simulation), include the 
following:  
1. Design modifications ± although not the 
preferred option for existing ships unless they 
are easy to implement and are cost-effective  
2. Active, counter-ballasting, counter-flooding 
measures ± these are damage-specific 
therefore, verification may be extensive. In 
order to realise the potential gains, additional 
verification is required: 
a. Relevant ship systems must be 
demonstrated to be available (Safe Return 
to Port concept of SOLAS Ch.II-2) ± note 
that 16% of the hazards related to damage 
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control relate to ship systems redundancy 
in case of flooding 
b. Crew competence and preparedness must 
be demonstrated (objective evidence as per 
or beyond SOLAS and ISM Code 
requirements). Note that 32% of the 
hazards identified relate to damage control. 
Of those, the majority (78%) can be 
controlled by effective crew performance 
and/or effective operating procedures. 
 
Risk reduction 
 
Effective evacuation and rescue (EER) 
arrangements also reduce the risk to people. 
These measures can be successful only if the ship 
remains afloat and upright for as long as 
necessary to complete the ship abandonment 
process. Therefore the following is required to 
demonstrate risk reduction: 
1. Time line of key events in the flooding 
process ± e.g. time to reach a heel angle of, 
say 20 degrees. This can be provided by the 
numerical flooding simulations (alternative 
approach) 
2. A verification of the time required to carry out 
VKLSDEDQGRQPHQWDVSHUWKHVKLS¶VPXVWHUOLVW
This includes quantification of the time for 
general alarm, response and mustering, 
embarkation of LSA, deployment of LSA and 
sail away from vessel. 
3. Crew competence and preparedness must be 
demonstrated (objective evidence as per or 
beyond SOLAS and ISM Code requirements) 
± Note that 32% of the hazards identified 
relate to ship abandon and rescue. Of those, 
the large majority (86%) can be controlled by 
effective crew performance and/or effective 
operating procedures. 
 
CONLCUDING REMARKS 
 
1. Building on the knowledge and understanding 
of damage stability fundamentals, a process 
has been elucidated to address the 
vulnerability to flooding of passenger ships 
from a life-cycle perspective and with focus 
on operational and emergency response 
measures alongside the more traditional design 
measures, with emphasis of application on 
existing ships. 
2. An initiative undertaken by INTERFERRY 
Europe is putting this concept to test, starting 
with workshop to assess the impact of possible 
changes in the required subdivision index R 
and the potential implications for existing 
vessels should IMO decided to apply the new 
requirements retrospectively.  
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